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Abstract
This paper considers a matching model of the labor market where workers,
who have private information on their quality, signal to firms that also diﬀer in
quality. Signals allow assortative matching in which the highest-quality workers
send the highest signals and are hired by the best firms. Matching is consid-
ered both when wages are rigid (non-transferable utility) and when they are fully
flexible (transferable utility). In both cases, equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs
depend on the distributions of worker and firm types. This is in contrast with
separating equilibria of the standard model, which do not respond to changes in
supply or demand. With sticky wages, despite incomplete information, equilib-
rium investment in education by low-ability workers can be ineﬃciently low, and
this distortion can become worse in a more competitive environment. In contrast,
with flexible wages, greater competition improves eﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
It is now more than thirty years since Spence (1973) introduced the idea that invest-
ment in education could be undertaken as a signal to prospective employers. Although
Spence’s classic work provided many important insights, it arguably provides an in-
complete picture of the labor market phenomena it set out to model. In particular,
whereas workers diﬀer in quality, firms are in eﬀect identical and oﬀer the same wages.
This ignores the role of educational achievement in eﬀectively allocating heterogeneous
workers to heterogeneous jobs. A modified model with diﬀerentiated employers could
also resolve another known problem with the Spence model. There, in any separating
equilibrium, strategies and outcomes (such as wages) do not respond to changes in the
relative frequency of high- and low-quality workers. That is, the wages of skilled workers
are oddly unresponsive to changes in the supply of either skilled or unskilled labor. In
contrast, in the model presented in this paper, workers compete for high-quality jobs
that are in scarce supply. As a result, the quality and quantity of workers and the
relative supply of jobs all matter for equilibrium outcomes.
This type of model is important because many real-world labor markets, particu-
larly for professionals, clearly have vertical diﬀerentiation on both sides of the market.
There is careful eﬀort devoted by both sides to ensuring a good match between em-
ployer and employee, and intense competition for high-ranked employers and for star
candidates. This strongly resembles Becker’s (1973) marriage matching model, which
allows for diﬀerences in quality on both sides of the market. However, the literature on
matching has assumed that employment decisions are made on the basis of the intrinsic
characteristics of candidates. This ignores the clear competition between candidates in
educational achievement in order to achieve top jobs. Equally, while the literature on
tournaments in labor economics goes back to Lazear and Rosen (1981), tournaments
are usually assumed to be internal to a firm. In contrast, here I look at what I call a
“matching tournament” model of a labor market in which agents make an investment
decision before participating in a frictionless matching market. If that investment is
a signal of otherwise unobservable ability, then matching tournaments marry aspects
of both Spence’s and Becker’s models. When combined with the comparative statics
methodology developed here, matching tournaments allow one to analyze how matching
considerations aﬀect the level of competition in signaling activity.
This paper investigates matching tournaments under incomplete information in two
situations: when wages are sticky and when they are fully flexible. Workers undertake
visible investment in education to signal underlying heterogeneous ability. Employers
are also vertically diﬀerentiated, but this is observable. In a separating equilibrium,
there is positive assortative matching in which high-quality workers send high signals
and are matched with high-quality firms. Equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs depend on
the distributions of characteristics of both firms and workers. This is shown to hold
even when wages are determined by bargaining between workers and firms (transfer-
able utility), provided the stronger assumption is imposed that workers and firms are
complements in production. That is, there is a dependence on demand and supply that
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is absent in Spence’s original model. An increase in the quantity or quality of labor
or a decrease in the quality of jobs increases the competitiveness of the labor market.
Under sticky wages, this leads to higher investment by high types, but low types are
discouraged and invest less. In a more diﬃcult situation, low-ranking workers have little
prospect of a good job and so have a lower incentive to compete. With flexible wages,
both investment and wages fall at each level of ability and wages fall for each level of
investment.
Signaling models are well known for generating ineﬃciently high investment in sig-
nals. But in the current matching tournament environment, this is married with a
hold-up problem: workers may not take into account the benefit of their investment
to potential partners and hence invest ineﬃciently little. When wages are flexible, the
signaling eﬀect is stronger and investment is everywhere too high. However, when wages
are not flexible, the hold-up eﬀect dominates for low-ability workers, who will invest
below the social optimum. In contrast, high achievers can overinvest.
Even more interesting is how the level of eﬃciency responds to changes, such as an
increase in quantity or quality of labor supply. Increased competition leads to lower
and thus more eﬃcient investment under flexible wages. But when wages are not fully
flexible, increased competition makes investment less eﬃcient as it discourages low-
ability workers, who already invest too little. If one takes the U.S. labor market to be
closer to the flexible model and European markets to be closer to the less flexible, the
two diﬀerent forms of matching tournament oﬀer a way of comparing the diﬀering eﬀect
of demand and supply shocks on these diﬀerent labor markets. This analysis suggests
that, when wages are not fully flexible, there is a serious poverty trap at the bottom end
of the distribution. Greater competition discourages rather than encourages low-ability
workers to invest in human capital, and decreases rather than increases eﬃciency.
This is not the case in the classic signaling model of Spence (1973), or its general-
ization to a continuous type space (see Spence 1974; Mailath 1987). Specifically, in a
separating equilibrium of the classic model, a signaler’s equilibrium payoﬀs are deter-
mined by the absolute level of her productivity, for example, she ends up being paid
her marginal product, and this is independent of market conditions. Further, the type
of signal sent does not determine which kind of job is obtained with which type of em-
ployer. This is despite the fact that educational achievement clearly has this allocative
function in real-world labor markets.1 Of course, there are other equilibria in Spence’s
model. For instance, in a pooling equilibrium, the wage paid is equal to average worker
quality and depends on the distribution of ability. This implies that if worker quality
rises then so do wages. However, it is shown that, in the separating outcome considered
here, an increase in worker quality causes wages to fall at each ability level and for each
level of investment. Pooling equilibria also exist in the current model but are eﬀectively
no diﬀerent from pooling outcomes in the Spence model.
In the separating equilibrium of the model presented here, a signaler’s payoﬀ will
1Strangely, more has been written on how conspicuous consumption signals suitability to potential
social partners (Pesendorfer 1995; Rege 2008).
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depend on which type of job she is able to obtain. High-quality jobs are in fixed supply
and are allocated to the most successful candidates. An agent’s job market outcome
will therefore depend on her rank in the distribution of types in the population.2 Fur-
thermore, changes in the distribution of jobs available or in quality of other workers
will change her competitive position and hence how much she must signal to commu-
nicate successfully that she is a leading candidate. The classic model can be derived
as a special case of our model simply by setting the two distributions on either side
of the market to be identical. Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 2001) pioneered
the analysis of matching tournaments but concentrated on this case.3 The comparative
statics results in this paper are obtained by changing one distribution while holding the
other constant, something clearly not possible when they are constrained to be equal.
This paper looks at labor market matching under two diﬀering assumptions: first
with constraints on wage setting and second when wages are flexible. This diﬀerence
corresponds to the distinction between non-transferable utility (NTU) and transferable
utility (TU) found in the matching literature. It is assumed that any match between a
worker and a firm produces a surplus. In the NTU case, there are exogenous constraints
on how this surplus can be divided. Wages can still depend on the value of the match but
are not fully flexible as in TU. Although TUmight seem the more natural assumption to
many economists, the NTU matching tournament may prove a better fit for some real-
world matching markets. For example, Bulow and Levin (2006) observe that wages paid
for medical residents are “impersonal”. That is, they are set before the labor market
commences and are not sensitive to the individual characteristics of the candidate who
is hired (but vary across hiring institutions). In Europe the situation is often even more
extreme: in most equivalent professional labor markets, wages are set at the national
level and so there is no variation at all. For example, within most European countries,
each university will pay new faculty the same starting salary.
One might well think that wage rigidity is the source of the positional eﬀects found in
matching tournaments, where high-ranking workers earn rents from their high relative
position. Imagine that the quality of workers is poor; the best of that poor bunch
would get the best job even if low quality in absolute terms. In contrast, if wages were
flexible (the TU case), then one might think that any such positional rents would be
bargained away: low-quality workers would be oﬀered low wages. In the end, just as in
the classical models, workers would be paid their product. It is shown in Section 3 that
this is not the case. If the additional assumption is made that the attributes of workers
and firms are strict complements in production, then equilibrium wages, signaling and
welfare all depend on the distributions of characteristics of both firms and workers.
Even with fully flexible wages, earnings and investment in education by workers of a
given ability level will depend on the level of competition from other workers.
Matching tournaments were introduced by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992,
2An intriguing aspect of this model is that, because equilibrium utility will be increasing in one’s
rank, an outside observer might conclude that workers had an intrinsic concern for relative position.
3They also concentrate on situations of complete information, although a brief treatment of signaling
appears in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995).
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1995). This paper is one of the first to look at comparative statics in such models.
Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) recently and independently have also examined the
comparative statics of matching tournaments. Their work is innovative in its develop-
ment of techniques to deal with a finite number of participants (and taking the limit as
the number approaches infinity). However, importantly, they assume that signaling is
a pure waste and therefore always exceeds the socially optimal level. In contrast, one
focus of the analysis here is the possibility of underinvestment that can be compounded
by greater competition. Further, here there is a treatment of both TU and NTU in
the context of a labor market, which permits the analysis of how diﬀerences in wage
flexibility aﬀect signaling behaviour. In contrast, Hoppe et al. concentrate on NTU
matching in a relatively abstract environment.
Finally, while allocation is the primary concern of the literatures on the assignment
of workers to jobs and on matching, it has always been assumed that matching occurs on
the basis of intrinsic characteristics rather than on choices made by participants. That is
why in pure matching models, although similar comparative statics exercises are possible
(Costrell and Loury 2004), they have nothing to say about competition for matches
or workers’ investment decisions and whether the resulting investment is eﬃcient. In
summary, standard signaling models capture competition between workers but lack
sensible comparative statics; assignment and matching models allow comparative statics
but lack competition. This paper shows that matching tournaments incorporate the best
features of both classes of model.
2 Matching Tournaments
This section outlines a model of a matching tournament, where the prizes of a standard
tournament are replaced by matching opportunities. I have in mind three prime exam-
ples: students competing for places at college, the marriage market, and the market for
jobs. For example, students in the final year of graduate school seek faculty positions
at universities. I will use the terminology of this last case and talk about workers and
firms. I also make the simplifying assumption that workers have a common ordering
over potential jobs. That is, in (say) the academic job market, all graduating students
agree on the best university position, the second best and so on. Employers all agree
that they would like to hire the most able candidate, but the ability of candidates is
not observable. Hence, potential employers can only infer the ability of workers from
an investment decision in education, made before matching. We shall look at equilibria
in which all employers rank all workers in terms of this investment. In this paper, the
employers have no investment decision of their own to make. Indeed, one can also con-
sider, as a special case of the model, situations such as sports tournaments where the
“firms” are only inanimate monetary prizes, which are assigned to candidates according
to their performance.
The model can be viewed as an incomplete information version of the model in-
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troduced by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 1995, 1998, 2001), hereafter CMP.
However, we generalize their model to allow for diﬀerent distributions of characteristics
on the two sides of the market. This will allow both for a richer model and for compar-
ative statics analysis of the eﬀect of changes in those distributions. This generalization
also distinguishes our model from standard signaling models.
There are two populations of agents: workers and firms. Each population is taken
to be a continuum and each is diﬀerentiated in quality, with a worker’s type or ability
z being distributed on [z, z¯] with z ≥ 0 according to the distribution G(z). This
distribution is twice diﬀerentiable with strictly positive bounded density g(z). Firms are
also diﬀerentiated in quality s, which has the twice diﬀerentiable distribution function
H(s) on [s, s¯] and has strictly positive bounded density h(s) (in the case of a sports
tournament, H(s) is just the distribution of prize money).
There are two principal diﬀerences between firms and workers. First, the type of a
worker is her private information, whereas the types of firms are common knowledge.
Second, workers must make an investment decision before attempting to match with
firms. In particular, they must choose a visible level of investment x from the positive
real line [0,∞). Following Spence, this could be a choice of education level. A worker’s
type z is usual interpreted as her ability and is positively related to the worker’s pro-
ductivity. After the choice of investment, matching will take place, with one worker
matching with each firm. A match between a worker of type z investing x with a firm
of type s will produce output π(z, s, x), where π(·) is a smooth increasing function. As
we shall see, stable matching is positive and assortative. That is, workers with high z
will match with firms with high s.
In this matching tournament, an equilibrium will have two components: a strategy
for the workers x(z) that gives the choice of investment as a function of worker type,
and a matching scheme that assigns workers to firms. For an equilibrium, the matching
scheme must be stable given observable investment and the strategy x(z).4 Second,
no worker can have an incentive to deviate given the strategies of her fellow workers
and the matching scheme in place during the matching phase. The equilibrium is like
that of CMP (2001), a hybrid. The second stage of the tournament is treated as a
cooperative game, in that it requires stability in the matching process.5 However, the
choice of investments in the first stage is non-cooperative. We call such an equilibrium
symmetric if all workers use the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(z) from
type to investment.
The equilibriumwill be constructed as follows. First, I show that, if there is complete
separation in choice of investment, then the only stable matching in the second stage
4In a fully separating equilibrium, the matching will also be stable ex post. That is, firms will not
regret their match once the type of the worker has been revealed.
5Following the literature on cooperative matching, I look at stable matchings, and not the procedure
that produces them. However, there are ways of modeling the matching process non-cooperatively,
admittedly assuming away frictions, that would generate the same results; see CMP (1998) or Niederle
and Yariv (2008).
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is positive and assortative. Second, moving backwards to the first stage, I show that
there exists a unique separating strategy from which no worker wishes to deviate, given
the behavior of other workers and the anticipated positive assortative matching.
Recall the assumption that the product from a match is π(z, s, x). Assume further
that (a) π(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and (b) π(·) is (weakly) increasing in
all its arguments. Within this general framework, we can consider two special cases.
Story A: Valueless Signaling. Here the observable action x is itself of no use to firms.
But, it may serve as a signal of a worker’s type z, and the profit of firms is increasing
in the type of their match. For example, as in Spence’s (1973) classic model, education
may signal ability. The product of a match is strictly increasing in the worker’s type:
πz(z, s, x) > 0 and πx(z, s, x) = 0.
Story B: Constructive Signaling. Here the observable action x increases the product of
a match. However, the product also depends on a worker’s unobservable type z. For
example, education may increase human capital as well as signal ability. The product of
a match is strictly increasing in both a worker’s type and her investment: πx(z, s, x) > 0
and πz(z, s, x) > 0.
In this section, I consider preferences under non-transferable utility (transferable
utility is analyzed in Section 3).6 In general, NTU means that the benefits arising from
the match between firm and worker are in some way indivisible and/or non-excludable;
under TU the product of the match is freely divisible. The interpretation in our con-
text is that under TU wages are fully flexible, but under NTU have some rigidity. The
increased flexibility under TU makes stable matching harder to achieve, because alter-
native matches are easier to negotiate. Consequently, for positive assortative matching
to hold, stronger assumptions are required than with NTU.
Let us assume, similarly to Spence (1974), that utility for workers is of the following
form:
U(z, s, x) = b(z, s, x)− c(z, x), (1)
where b denotes benefits and c costs. Costs will be increasing in investment x but
decreasing in a worker’s ability z. More precisely, assume the following properties: (i)
b(·) and c(·) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable; (ii) bs(z, s, x) > 0, bz(z, s, x) ≥ 0, and
bx(z, s, x) ≥ 0 (monotonicity of benefits); (iii) cx(z, x) > 0 and cz(z, x) < 0 (monotonic-
ity of costs); (iv) bzx(z, s, x) ≥ 0, bzs(z, s, x) ≥ 0, and czx(z, x) < 0 (complementarity);
(v) bxx(z, s, x) ≤ 0 and cxx(z, x) > 0 (concavity).
These assumptions are compatible with the two principal stories used within the
NTU literature. First, if we interpret the firm’s type s as its level of prestige, we could
have b(z, s, x) = wˆ+s. That is, the benefit from the job is a fixed wage wˆ plus its prestige
s.7 Second, taking s to be a productive asset, such as the firm’s existing human or
6Legros and Newman (2007) consider matching in the intermediate case where the degree of trans-
ferability is a variable.
7For example, academic wages in some European countries are fixed by national agreement. Since all
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physical capital, some form of wage inflexibility would justify b(z, s, x) = απ(z, s, x) for
some α ∈ (0, 1). Social conventions or legal constraints fix wages as a fixed proportion
of the product of a match. Firms receive the product π(·) from a match, less wages.8
Thus firms, in their choice of worker, simply prefer the one who generates the highest
product. That is, the profits of firms are strictly increasing in z (Story A) or in both x
and z (Story B).
Following CMP (1992, 1998), a matching is a function φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that a
worker with rank G(zi) is matched with a firm of rank H(sj), φ(G(zi)) = H(sj) ∈ [0, 1].
The matching function φ is measure-preserving and one-to-one on φ([0, 1]). That is, for
all measurable subsets A ⊂ [0, 1], φ−1(A) is measurable and λ(φ−1(A)) = λ(A), where
λ denotes Lebesgue measure. A matching is stable if there does not exist i 6= i0 ∈ [0, 1]
such that φ(i0)Piφ(i) and iPφ(i0)i0, where P denotes “preferred to”, and both preferences
hold strictly.
The first condition is the equivalent in a continuum to the assumption with finite
numbers that exactly one worker is matched to one firm. It is stated in terms of the
types - firm quality s and worker ability z - to ensure that matching is feasible. The
second is the stability condition, standard in most matching problems, that requires
that matches made are not subject to unraveling in the sense that it should not be
possible to find a worker and a firm who would prefer to match with each other in place
of their current matches. The main issue here is that a firm must choose a worker on
the basis of visible investment x, because her type z is hidden. We make the standard
assumption that firms’ beliefs must be consistent with equilibrium strategies. The case
on which we focus is where the workers’ equilibrium strategy x(z) is strictly increasing
and hence separating. Then, firms must believe that a higher investment implies higher
ability. Thus, under Story A or Story B, a firm will prefer worker i over worker j if
and only if xi > xj. Lastly, workers’ utility is strictly increasing in firm type s which is
public information, thus a worker prefers firm i over firm j if and only if si > sj.
Suppose for the moment that there exists a symmetric equilibrium strategy x(z) that
is diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing (we will go on to show that such an equilibrium
exists). Let us aggregate all the investment decisions of the workers into a distribution
summarized by a distribution function F (x). A strictly increasing symmetric strategy
implies that, in equilibrium, an agent of type zi who produces x(zi)would have a position
in the distribution of investment F (x(zi)) equal to his rank G(zi) in the distribution
of ability. This enables the firms to infer which worker is in fact the most able. This
in turn allows the matches to be made through the following assortative matching
mechanism such that workers with high (respectively low) x are matched with firms
with high (respectively low) s. More specifically, a worker’s rank in level of investment
determines the rank of his match. That is, a worker who chooses xi will achieve a match
of value si = H−1(F (xi)) or F (xi) = H(si). Then, we can show that the assortative
universities pay the same, candidates simply prefer to be employed by the most prestigious institution.
8Implicitly it is also assumed that money wages paid to a worker by a firm are always less than the
firm and worker’s joint product π(z, s, x). That is, the firms’ participation constraint is always met.
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scheme outlined here is stable. That is, we can find no worker and firm who would both
prefer each other in place of their current match.9
Lemma 1. Suppose all workers adopt a symmetric strictly increasing strategy x(z).
Then the only stable matching the assortative matching, such that a worker of type
zi ∈ [z, z¯] with investment xi = x(zi) has a match of type si, where
G(zi) = F (xi) = φ (G(zi)) = H(si). (2)
We now derive a symmetric equilibrium strategy for the workers. Suppose all agents
adopt a strictly increasing diﬀerentiable strategy x(z). Then the equilibrium relation-
ship (2) implies that we can define the function
S(z) = H−1(G(z)); (3)
this gives for a worker of type z his equilibrium match, which depends on both G and
H. Note that we have S0(z) = g(z)/h(S(z)). This implies an equilibrium utility of the
form:
U(z, S(z), x(z)) = b(z, S(z), x(z))− c(z, x(z)). (4)
Note that utility, through S(z), now depends on both the distribution G(z) of workers’
types and the distribution H(s) of firms’ characteristics. Furthermore, each worker’s
utility is increasing in her rank G(z) in the workforce.
Suppose positive assortative matching was assigned by a central planner, rather
than determined by the workers’ competitively chosen investments. In this case, what
level of investment would workers choose? Because workers can gain from their own
investment x, their choice will be greater than zero if indeed bx > 0. The level of
investment that is optimal in the absence of matching considerations will be useful as a
point of comparison with the Nash equilibrium level of investment that will eventually
be derived.
Definition 1. Let x = N(z) maximize U(z, S(z), x); that is, let the complementary
slackness condition
N(z) [bx(z, S(z), N(z))− cx(z,N(z))] = 0
hold at every level of z ∈ [z, z¯]. The function N(z) is the privately optimal level of
investment x under NTU.
Suppose now one agent produces x(zˆ) in place of her equilibrium choice x(z) and
then chooses zˆ to maximize her payoﬀ. Her reduced form utility is U(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ)),
which yields the following first order condition:
(bx(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ))− cx(z, x(zˆ)))x0(zˆ) + bs(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ))S0(zˆ) = 0. (5)
9Results of this type go back to Becker (1973). See Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995), Fernández
and Galí (1999) for a tournament approach similar to that employed here. Eeckhout (2000) and
Legros and Newman (2007) find conditions under which positive assortative matching is the only
stable matching scheme.
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In a symmetric equilibriumwemust have zˆ = z. Using this and rearranging the resulting
first order condition, we obtain the diﬀerential equation
x0(z) =
bs(z, S(z), x)
cx(z, x)− bx(z, S(z), x)
S0(z). (6)
This diﬀerential equation will give us our equilibrium strategy, when combined with
with the boundary condition x(z) = N(z), This boundary condition implies the lowest
ranked worker acts as though matching considerations did not matter. This reflects the
equilibrium competitive response to the expectation that one is going to come last.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique solution to the diﬀerential equation (6), with the
boundary condition x(z) = N(z). This solution, together with the assortative matching
scheme (2), constitutes the unique symmetric separating equilibrium to the tournament
matching game under NTU. In equilibrium, investment is greater and workers’ equilib-
rium utility is lower than with privately optimum investment; that is, x(z) > N(z) and
U(z, S(z), x(z)) < U(z, S(z), N(z)) everywhere on (z, z¯].
The proof follows (see the Appendix) from the results of Mailath (1987) on the
existence of separating equilibria in standard signaling models. Because it is a separating
equilibrium, beliefs held by firms about worker quality will be accurate. Specifically,
a firm observing a worker who invests xi correctly believes that her quality is zi =
x−1(xi). On the other hand, it is possible, as in standard signaling models, to construct
other equilibria based on diﬀerent beliefs. For example, a pooling equilibrium where
all workers choose the same investment level xˆ can be supported if all firms believe
that levels of investment other than xˆ indicate a low-quality worker. Since all firms
consequently view all workers as being equally able (and all have the same investment),
any matching, including random matching, would be stable.
An important question will be whether separating equilibria are eﬃcient. Compare
x(z) with N(z), the amount invested if the assortative matching scheme S(z) was
imposed. The above proposition establishes that, from the point of view of workers,
they are Pareto ranked. Workers obtain the same match in both cases, but with higher
eﬀort in the separating equilibrium. All workers (except the lowest type z) would be
better oﬀ under N(z). To be clear, this does not imply that N(z) is socially optimal.
When investment is productive and enters into the profits of firms (Story B), welfare is
a more complex issue. We discuss this further in Section 5.
3 Transferable Utility
Suppose in contrast to what we have assumed so far that the surplus created bymatching
is fully divisible between the two partners. In the labor market we consider, this means
that workers and firms must bargain over wages. However, even with flexible wages,
the job that a worker obtains and her equilibrium utility will still depend on her rank
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in the distribution of workers. Furthermore, the wage she is paid in equilibrium will
depend on both the distribution of worker ability G(z) and the distribution of firm
quality H(s).
Becker (1973) discovered that in this case of transferable utility (TU), assortative
matching is only stable if the two attributes, here z and s, are complements in a joint
production process. This is in contrast to the case of non-transferable utility assumed
up to now, where stability requires only that workers’ utility be increasing in s and
firms’ profits be increasing in z. In this section, we therefore need some additional
assumptions on the production function π(z, s, x): (c) πzs(z, s, x) > 0 and πzx(z, s, x) ≥
0 (complementarity); (d) πsx(z, s, x) = 0 (partial separability); (e) πxx(z, s, x) ≤ 0
(concavity in investment). The complementarity condition (c) will be needed to ensure
stability of positive assortative matching. Condition (d) is a convenient simplification
that will allow integrability of the wage function. Condition (e) will help to define the
privately optimal investment.
Denote the share of this product that goes to the worker as a wage w, and share of
the firm, a profit r = π(z, s, x)− w. We now replace the original form of the worker’s
utility with
U(z, w, x) = w − c(z, x), (7)
which is exactly the form assumed by Spence (1974). That is, now the worker only
values a match in terms of the wages she will receive from that job. The assumptions
on the cost function c(z, x) remain the same.
What I again assume is that workers make their choice of investment non-cooperatively.
Then, matching between firms and workers takes place cooperatively in that the out-
come is assumed to be stable. In equilibrium, no worker has an incentive to deviate given
others’ choices and the matching scheme. With transferable utility, positive assortative
matching will not be stable unless the product of the match π(z, s, x) can be divided in
such a way that no worker-firm pair of diﬀering ranks has the incentive to match with
each other rather than with a partner of the same rank. To determine this, first, we
examine what the conditions for stable assortative matching would be under complete
information. Second, we find that, because of the partial separability assumption (d),
the stability condition implies a wage schedule w(z, s, x) that does not depend on the
functional form of the workers’ strategy x(z). This means that the wage schedule is
also applicable in the separating equilibrium of the game of incomplete information.10
This is possible because in a separating equilibrium, workers’ actions fully reveal their
underlying type.
The first step in determining the appropriate level of wages under complete informa-
tion is taken from Becker’s (1973) observation that stability requires that the payment
to each partner should be related to her marginal productivity. Given that here a
10That is, the functional form of the wage schedule is the same under complete and incomplete infor-
mation. However, it will be shown that workers’ choices of investment will be higher with incomplete
information. Feeding this higher investment into the same wage schedule implies that wages at a given
ability level will be higher than under complete information. See Example 1 at the end of this section.
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worker’s output depends both on her type z and her investment x, assumption (d)
will be important. It implies that a worker’s choice of investment x does not aﬀect her
match. This is because, while condition (c) ensures complementarity in types, condition
(d) means that there is no complementarity between firm quality and worker invest-
ment. Together they ensure that, under complete information, firms only care about
a worker’s ability z in choosing whom to hire. Thus, we consider positive assortative
matching only in terms of workers’ ability. Specifically, again we look at the case where
a worker of ability z will be matched with a firm of type S(z). For this matching to be
stable, for a given level of investment x, we must have
w(z + ε, S(z + ε), x) + π(z, S(z), x)− w(z, S(z), x) ≥ π(z + ε, S(z), x). (8)
That is, the total payoﬀ to a worker of type z+ε and a firm of type S(z)must be greater
under the current matching arrangements than the output from a matching between
each other. Otherwise, the worker of type z + ε could strike a bargain with the firm of
type S(z) whereby both would be better oﬀ.
Turning to investment, if we fix the type of worker at z, for stability given two
workers producing investment levels x+ ε and x, it must be that
w(z, S(z), x+ ε) + π(z, S(z), x)− w(z, S(z), x) ≥ π(z, S(z), x+ ε). (9)
It is possible to derive equilibrium marginal conditions on the wage function by taking
the limit ε to zero. Specifically, in the proof of Proposition 2 below, it is shown that
from (8) and (9) one can derive
wz(z, S(z), x) + ws(z, S(z), x)S0(z) = πz(z, S(z), x), wx(z, S(z), x) = πx(z, S(z), x).
(10)
Finally, we need a boundary condition for wage bargaining. Suppose that the lowest
wage is exogenously fixed at C ≥ 0. It is then possible to integrate the marginal
conditions (10) to derive the wage function w(z, S(z), x) given below. This in turn will
support positive assortative matching as a stable outcome for the matching tournament.
Proposition 2. Let C be an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 ≤ C ≤ π(z, s, 0). Assume
complete information and that the workers’ strategy x(z) is increasing. Then positive
assortative matching that satisfies the relation (2) is stable given the bargaining solution,
w(z, S(z), x) =
Z z
z
πz(t, S(t), 0) dt+
Z x
0
πx(z, S(z), t) dt+ C; (11)
and this is the only stable matching.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) oﬀer a much more detailed treatment of a
similar problem but where only the investment x but not the type z matters for the
surplus π.11 In our setup, the bargaining solution is complicated by wages potentially
11In particular, they show that the bargaining solution, here w(·), can have a finite number of
discontinuities or jumps, although, completely continuous solutions are not excluded. For simplicity, I
concentrate on continuous solutions.
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depending on both type z and action x. In this context, assumption (d) is helpful as
it implies that the marginal conditions (10) are integrable. To see this, diﬀerentiate
the right hand side of the wage equation (11) with respect to z and observe that the
derivative matches the first diﬀerential equation in (10) only if πsx = 0.
This means that it is possible to construct the wage function w(z, S(z), x) from the
matching function S(z) and the exogenous functions πz, πx, without knowing the equi-
librium investment function x(z). Alternatively, one could combine the two diﬀerential
equations (10) into a single one in terms of observable investment, or
w0(x) = wx(γ(x), S(z), x) +
wz(γ(x), S(γ(x)), x) + ws(γ(x), S(γ(x)), x)S0(γ(x))
x0(γ(x))
(12)
where γ(x) = x−1(x), the inverse of the workers’ strategy. But clearly such an approach
depends on the strategy x(z). This in turn would require simultaneous solution of the
wage schedule and investment strategy, that is solution of the simultaneous diﬀerential
equations (12) and (14). Assumption (d) thus allows the current simpler method at a
relatively small cost in loss of generality.12
I now turn to incomplete information. Matches will be made and wage bargains
struck on the basis of the perceived type of the workers. However, in any separating
outcome, the wage equation (11) derived above is still the condition for stability. Firms
can observe investment, from investment they can accurately deduce ability. More
precisely, if all workers adopt the strictly increasing strategy x(z), then, in equilibrium,
firms must believe that a worker choosing investment x(zˆ) is of type zˆ. Note that
positive assortative matching is stable under the wage schedule (11) for any positive
relationship between investment x and z, regardless of its exact functional form. Thus,
whatever the separating strategy x(z), if firms oﬀer a wage w(zˆ, S(zˆ), x(zˆ)) to a worker
with visible investment x(zˆ), then positive assortive matching will be stable. Further,
this is the only stable matching.
We now turn to the prior stage where workers choose investment non-cooperatively.
I assume that a separating strategy x(z) is adopted by all workers and that consequently
wages are determined by the wage equation (11) and see if workers have an incentive
to deviate. If one worker contemplates a deviation to x(zˆ), that is, investing as if
he were of type zˆ, then he would be perceived to be of type zˆ and expect a match
with a firm of type S(zˆ) and a payment of w(zˆ, S(zˆ), x(zˆ)), even though the actual
product of the match will be π(z, S(zˆ), x(zˆ)). This gives a reduced-form utility of
U = w(zˆ, S(zˆ), x(zˆ))− c(z, x(zˆ)). To find the condition for such a deviation not to be
profitable, diﬀerentiate this with respect to zˆ and set the resulting derivative to zero.
For a symmetric equilibrium, set zˆ = z in the first-order condition to obtain
wz(z, S(z), x(z)) + ws(z, S(z), x(z))S0(z) + (wx(z, S(z), x(z))− cx(z, x(z)))x0(z) = 0.
(13)
12I do not believe that assumption (d) aﬀects the qualitative results obtained. While this assumption
is essential for Proposition 2, it could be replaced by a (weaker) complementarity assumption πsx ≥ 0
in the proof of the comparative statics result Proposition 5 below.
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Then substituting from (10), one obtains the following diﬀerential equation:
x0(z) =
πz(z, S(z), x)
cx(z, x)− πx(z, S(z), x)
. (14)
In order to provide a boundary condition for this equation, we must define a level
of investment x which is privately optimal, that is, one that is independent of matching
considerations. Assume that the positive assortative matching scheme S(z) is exoge-
nously imposed. This implies that an increase in x can only increase wages by increasing
output, not by achieving a more favorable match. Or in other words, in the absence
of matching considerations we need only consider the partial derivative of wages with
respect to investment wx(z, S(z), x) = πx. This enables the following definition.
Definition 2. Let x = T (z) maximize U = w(z, S(z), x)− c(z, x); that is, the comple-
mentary slackness condition
T (z) [wx(z, S(z), T (z))− cx(z, T (z))] = T (z) [πx(z, S(z), T (z))− cx(z, T (z))] = 0 (15)
holds at every level of z ∈ [z, z¯]. The function T (z) is called the privately optimal level
of investment x under TU.
Equation (15) has a unique solution by assumption (e) on π(·) and the assumption
that c(·) is convex in x. Note that when investment is productive (Story B, πx > 0),
then it can be that T (z) > 0. That is, the equilibrium investment by the least able
worker may be greater than zero (but when πx = 0, then T (z) = 0). This is because,
with productive investment and transferable utility, additional investment is worthwhile
even to the least able as it increases wages. In any case, this privately optimal level
of investment will give us the appropriate boundary condition, x(z) = T (z) for the
equilibrium diﬀerential equation. That is, again the lowest-ranked worker choose the
privately optimal investment. This, together with the earlier Proposition 1, leads to
the next result.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique solution to the diﬀerential equation (14). To-
gether with the boundary condition x(z) = T (z) and with the assortative matching
scheme (2) and the wage function (11), this solution constitutes a symmetric equilibrium
of the tournament matching game with transferable utility. In equilibrium, investment is
greater and workers’ equilibrium utility is lower than with privately optimum investment;
that is, x(z) > T (z) and w(z, S(z), x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) < w(z, S(z), T (z)) − c(z, T (z))
everywhere on (z, z¯].
Our equilibrium diﬀerential equation (14), while clearly not identical to the diﬀer-
ential equation (6) that arose in the NTU case, does depend on the distributions G(z)
and H(s) through the function S(z). Hence, both equilibrium payments w(z, S(z), x)
and the equilibrium strategy x(z) will respond to changes in either in the distribution
of ability G(z) or of jobs H(z). As well as the above separating equilibrium, there will
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also exist pooling equilibria in which wages would reflect average productivity. In that
sense, it is true that pooling equilibria, of the current and classic model, do respond
to changes in demand and supply that aﬀect average productivity. In particular, an
increase in the quality of workers would lead to an increase in wages while investment
would remain fixed across all workers. In contrast, in the separating equilibrium we
examine, we will see that investment would change, and wages would fall at each level
of ability.
In any case, just as for NTU, in the separating equilibrium investment is excessive
from the point of view of workers. All workers (except with the lowest ability z) will
invest more than what is privately optimal. Wages can be higher but the increase in
costs is greater so that workers are definitely worse oﬀ than with assortative matching
and the privately optimal level of investment. Here is a specific example of such an
equilibrium.
Example 1. Assume that the production function is π(z, s, x) = zs + x and that the
cost function is c(z, x) = x2 − xz + x. Assume further G(·) = H(·) with z = s = 0 so
that S(z) = z. Thus, πz(z, S(z), x) = S(z) and πx(z, S(z), x) = 1. If w(0, 0, 0) = 0,
then by the previous analysis, w(z, S(z), x) = z2/2 + x. In this case, solving (15),
the privately optimal investment is T (z) = z/2. In contrast, for the noncooperative
equilibrium the diﬀerential equation (14) is now x0(z) = z/(2x − z) with x(0) = 0,
which has the solution x(z) = z. Given the privately optimal investment, wages would
be w(z, S(z), T (z)) = z2/2 + z/2 and will be lower at a given level of ability z than in
the non-cooperative equilibrium, w(z, S(z), x(z)) = z2/2 + z, as there workers invest
more. However, given the additional costs incurred, workers would be better-oﬀ if all
made the privately optimal investment: w(z, S(z), T (z))− c(z, T (z)) = 3z2/4 > z2/2 =
w(z, S(z), x(z))− c(z, x(z)).
4 Comparative Statics
We will now consider the eﬀect on equilibrium utility and strategies of changes in
the distribution of workers’ abilities G(z) and of firms or jobs H(s). In doing this,
we consider only separating equilibria. We saw in Sections 2 and 3 that equilibrium
behavior depends on the matching function S which is jointly determined by G and H.
Our first question is what are the eﬀects of changes in the underlying distributions on
the matching function S(z). We will then be better placed to answer questions about
changes in equilibrium behavior.
In what follows we assume two economies A,B that are identical apart from having
diﬀerent distributions of workers or diﬀerent distributions of jobs. Importantly, we
interpret an increase in quality of workers or a decrease in the quality of jobs, in the form
respectively of a stochastically higher or stochastically lower distribution, as increases in
the competitiveness of the labor market. Since in the matching tournaments considered
here workers compete in quality, an increase in the quality of other workers will worsen
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worker type: z
rank
firm type: s
z z˜ z¯zˆss¯
H(s) 1
SB SA
GAGB
Figure 1: A worker with ability zˆ has a match SA under the stochastically higher
distribution of ability GA that is worse than the match SB under the lower distribution
of ability GB.
the competitive situation of a given worker. Equally, as workers compete to obtain high-
quality jobs, if high-quality jobs become relatively scarce, competition will become more
intense. Changes in the relative quantity of jobs and workers are considered in Section 6
below and give similar results. For investigation of the eﬀect of changes in the degree of
inequality amongst workers in a similar framework, see Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
For analysis of the eﬀect of changes in the distribution of prizes in tournaments, see
Moldovanu and Sela (2006), an analysis that is expanded to matching tournaments with
a finite number of participants in Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009). Hopkins and
Kornienko (2009, 2010) propose a diﬀerent methodology for comparative statics, which
makes comparisons at a constant rank (here r = G(z)) rather than at a constant ability
z.
When we change one distribution we hold the other constant. For example, suppose
we considered two distributions of workers GA(z) and GB(z), then the distribution of
jobs H(s) is fixed and is the same in both economy A and economy B. Further, I
assume that the support of the distribution of workers remains [z, z¯] and the support
of the distribution of jobs is [s, s¯]. Stochastic dominance is often used to order diﬀerent
distributions. One says one distributionGA stochastically dominates, or is stochastically
higher than, another distribution GB if GA(z) ≤ GB(z) for all z. Here, I employ a
modest refinement of stochastic dominance and write GA >st GB if GA(z) < GB(z) for
all z ∈ (z, z¯) and G0A(z) < G0B(z).13
Lemma 2. If either GA >st GB or if HB >st HA, then SA(z) < SB(z) for all z ∈ (z, z¯)
13Note that if, for example, GA(z) first-order stochastically dominates GB(z) then G0A(z) > G
0
B(z)
is not possible, and if the two distributions GA and GB are distinct then G0A(z) = G
0
B(z) is not generic.
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worker type: z
rank
firm type: s
z z¯zˆss¯
HA
HB
1
SASB
G(z)
Figure 2: A worker with ability zˆ has a match SA under the stochastically lower dis-
tribution of jobs HA that is worse than the match SB under the higher distribution of
jobs HB.
and S0A(z) < S
0
B(z).
That is, if the distribution of workers becomes stochastically higher, or if the dis-
tribution of job quality becomes stochastically worse, then the job assigned becomes
worse at almost every ability. Note that the comparative statics from changes in H are
the reverse to those from changes in G. These results are illustrated in Figures 1 and
2. Notice that if we constrain the distributions so that G(·) = H(·), then S(z) = z,
and any dependence of matching on the distributions disappear. As changes in the two
distributions have opposite eﬀects, if the two distributions are constrained to be equal
to each other, a movement of one distribution is cancelled out by the movement of the
other.
4.1 Non-Transferable Utility
We have just seen how matching responds to changes in the distribution of jobs H(s)
or workers G(z): in a more competitive environment, for a given level of ability z a
worker is matched with a worse job. We now see how equilibrium investment and
utility reacts to such changes. The eﬀects are not obvious as we will see that the eﬀect
on investment is not monotone. Low-ability workers will invest an amount that is closer
to their privately optimal amount in a more competitive economy, and yet they are still
worse-oﬀ.
This non-monotonicity of investment is easy to explain. Imagine a foot race where
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Figure 3: Comparative statics under NTU. A stochastically higher distribution of ability
or a stochastically lower distribution of job quality leads to a lower matching function
SA(z) and hence lower utility UA(z) and lower (higher) investment by workers of low
(high) ability.
a new, very fast runner is added to the field. Those runners who are not very fast
realize that the prospects of placing high up the field are even lower and therefore try
less hard. Those runners who are competing for the top places realize that competition
is now fiercer and respond accordingly.
Let U(z) = b(z, S(z), x(z))−c(z, x(z)) be a worker’s equilibrium utility under NTU.
We have by the envelope theorem, U 0(z) = bz(z, S(z), x(z))− cz(z, x(z)). I show that,
despite the ambiguous eﬀect on investment, equilibrium utility will be lower in a more
competitive environment, that is, when G(z) is stochastically higher or H(s) is stochas-
tically lower.
In eﬀect, the fall in S(z) at each level of z has a first order eﬀect on workers’ utility
through the benefit function b(z, S(z), x(z)). The fact that costs may also fall for low-
ability workers as their investment falls is not enough to compensate. The assumption
(iv) on complementarity in benefits and costs is crucial for this. These results are
illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 4. Suppose that either GA(z) >st GB(z), or HB(z) >st HA(z). Let UA(z)
and UB(z) and xA(z) and xB(z) be the corresponding NTU equilibrium utility and equi-
librium investment strategies respectively. Then, first, UA(z) < UB(z) for all z in (z, z¯].
Second, there is a point z˜ ∈ (z, z¯) such that xB(z) > xA(z) on the interval (z, z˜) and
xA(z) > xB(z) on (z˜, z¯].
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4.2 Transferable Utility
It is also possible to obtain comparative statics for the model under TU, including what
happens to wages when the distributions change. In particular, in a more competitive
economy there is lower investment by all types of worker. Investment falls because in a
more competitive situation, a worker of given ability obtains a worse job. Because firm
quality is a complementary factor to workers’ marginal product πz(z, S(z), x), the mar-
ginal product falls leading to lower incentives and less eﬀort. These results on investment
in turn imply a similar result on workers’ utility. Let U(z) = w(z, S(z), x(z))−c(z, x(z))
be workers’ equilibrium utility under TU. As in NTU, the eﬀect of a lower match value
S(z) dominates the eﬀect of lower costs due to lower investment. Thus, equilibrium
utility will be lower at every level of ability in a more competitive economy. These
results are illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 5. Suppose that either GA(z) >st GB(z) or HB(z) >st HA(z). Let UA(z)
and UB(z) and xA(z) and xB(z) be the corresponding TU equilibrium utility and equi-
librium investment strategies respectively. Then, xB(z) > xA(z) on (z, z¯]. Second,
UA(z) < UB(z) for all z in (z, z¯].
Define w(z) = w(z, S(z), x(z)) as the equilibrium wage schedule. One can then
show that, when the distribution of ability is stochastically higher, the equilibrium
wage is lower at each level of ability. In Spence’s (1973, 1974) original work, the wage
schedule was written in terms of visible investment or education x. Here, we have
w0(x) = w0(γ(x))/x0(γ(x)) where z = γ(x) = x−1(x), the inverse of the equilibrium
strategy x(z). The wage schedule will be a solution to this diﬀerential equation with
boundary condition w(x(z)) = C. This can be used to show that wages will also be
lower at each level of investment.
Proposition 6. Suppose that either GA(z) >st GB(z) or HB(z) >st HA(z). Let wA(z)
and wB(z) be the corresponding equilibrium wage schedules. Then, wB(z) > wA(z) on
(z, z¯] and wB(x) > wA(x) on (x(z), xA(z¯)].
4.3 Comparing NTU and TU
We have seen that there are diﬀerent comparative statics when wages are flexible (TU)
than when they are not (NTU). In particular, a more competitive environment, such as a
stochastically higher distribution of worker ability, produces uniformly lower investment
under TU but higher investment by the high-ability under NTU. Let us look at what
is driving this diﬀerence.
Suppose we take very simple formulations. For the NTU case, let b(z, s, x) = s, the
benefit of holding a job is simply equal to the quality of the employer. Then, we can
write the equilibrium diﬀerential equation (6) as
cx(z, x(z)) = S0(z)/x0(z). (16)
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Figure 4: Comparative statics under TU. A stochastically higher distribution of ability
or a stochastically lower distribution of job quality leads to a lower matching function
SA(z) and hence, lower utility UA(z) and lower investment xA(z) by workers.
Similarly, for expository purposes, suppose simply that π(z, s, x) = zs, then the diﬀer-
ential equation for the TU case (14) can be written
cx(z, x(z)) = S(z)/x0(z). (17)
In both cases, we have the marginal cost of increasing investment x on the left-hand
side, and the marginal benefit on the right.
In the TU case, the marginal benefit is proportional to S(z) (or more generally
πz(z, S(z), x)), and will be lower everywhere in a more competitive environment (see,
for example, Figure 1). Under TU, incentives are driven by the wage which is determined
by a worker’s marginal product. In a more competitive environment, a worker of a given
ability gains a lower value match. Since the employer type is a strict complement, the
worker’s marginal product falls, lowering the incentive to invest at all levels of ability.
However, in an NTU world, the marginal return depends on S0(z), the marginal
return to moving up in terms of one’s match. Again using the metaphor of a foot race,
replacing low-quality runners with high-quality runners increases the relative density of
competitors at high ability levels and reduces it at low levels. The incentive to invest
is increased for the high ability and reduced for the low ability.
5 Eﬃciency
This section addresses the eﬃciency of equilibrium investment decisions. Given the
presence of incomplete information, it is no surprise that full social eﬃciency is not
19
obtained. However, what is interesting is the application of the novel comparative
statics techniques introduced in the previous section to see whether eﬃciency increases
or decreases as the distributions of workers and jobs change.
If there are complementarities between firms and workers then from the results
of Becker (1973), the maximization of total output demands the positive assortative
matching scheme S(z). Since matching is eﬃcient, this allows us to concentrate on a
diﬀerent issue: whether, for each pair formed under this scheme, the worker chooses a
level of investment that is optimal from the point of view of joint welfare. Whether this
will be the case is not obvious as there are two factors that work in opposite directions.
First, workers are unlikely to internalize the benefit of the eﬀect of additional investment
on the profits of firms, leading to too little investment. That is, there is a form of hold-
up problem. Second, competition between workers for matching opportunities can push
investment up, possibly to excessive levels. In the case of complete information, CMP
(2001) find that as investment raises one’s marginal product, which in a TU framework
leads to higher wages, this solves the first problem. Thus, eﬃcient investment is possible
even without enforceable contracts (see also Peters and Siow 2002). However, Peters
(2007) finds that, in a NTU framework, again under complete information, the second
factor is stronger than the first, and investment is ineﬃciently high.
Turning to the tournaments under incomplete information considered here, we have
already seen that investment is excessive from the point of view of workers. This leads
immediately to the result that when such investment is not useful for firms (Story A),
its equilibrium level is also socially excessive. But it is possible to show that, under
TU, investment is still too high even when investment is productive. In contrast, under
NTU, I find productive investment under some circumstances will be too low.
This diﬀerence arises because what is privately optimal is also socially optimal under
TU, but is too low under NTU. The lowest ranked individual in both cases will choose
what is privately optimal. Thus, under NTU we start too low, and under TU we start
just right. As non-cooperative investment for higher levels of ability rises above the
privately optimal level, under TU investment will be too high everywhere, while under
NTU we may eventually rise above the social optimum at high levels of ability.
As the tournament becomes more competitive, the two cases diverge. As we have
seen in the previous section, greater competition lowers the quality of job obtained for
a given level of ability. This lowers a worker’s marginal product, leading to reduced
investment under TU. Thus, investment will become closer to the optimum. Under
NTU, greater competition discourages the low-ability and their investment falls, even
though it is too low already. However, high-ability workers will invest more under
greater competition even though their investment may already be excessive. Thus,
under NTU, greater competition can lead to greater ineﬃciency. Notice, however, we
have already seen that under both TU and NTU, this increase in competition makes
workers worse oﬀ (Propositions 4 and 5). So, any gains in eﬃciency in the TU case do
not go to workers.
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There is another potential point of comparison. Rege (2008) and Hoppe et al.
(2009), in matching tournament models similar to the current one, compare a separating
outcome that supports positive assortative matching not with the social optimum but
with a pooling outcome and consequent random matching. The welfare comparisons
are in general ambiguous as when there are complements in production, there is a
trade oﬀ between the costs of signaling and the benefits of assortative matching that it
permits. However, Hoppe et al. find that for plausible type distributions total welfare is
higher in the pooling equilibrium with zero signals than in the separating equilibrium.
An important diﬀerence is that in their analysis, signals are entirely wasteful (Story
A). Here, the most interesting results are where signals take the form of productive
investment. Clearly, a pooling equilibrium with zero or minimal investment will be less
attractive in such an environment than in the model of Hoppe et al. But achieving clear
welfare comparisons would not be possible in this more complex environment without
making very strong assumptions on preferences and costs.
5.1 Non-Transferable Utility
Under NTU, as we have already seen (Proposition 1), the lowest ability worker has no
incentive to invest more than is privately optimal. As we will now see, as under Story B,
such investment would benefit her employer, this level of investment is inadequate from
a social point of view. In contrast, for higher ability workers competition for matches
raises investment above privately optimal levels, and possibly above socially optimal
levels too.
Let us assume that the total welfare of an individual match between a firm and
worker is given by a weighted sum of the worker’s utility and the firm’s profit
W = U(z, S(z), x) + βπ(z, S(z), x) (18)
for some β > 0. For example, if the benefits to a worker are a fixed proportion of the
product b(z, s, x) = απ(z, s, x) with α ∈ (0, 1), then β = 1 − α. Then the first order
conditions for an interior solution to a social planner’s choice of investment are
dW
dx
= bx(z, S(z), x)− cx(z, x) + βπx(z, S(z), x) = 0 (19)
Note that if πx is zero, so that x is non-productive, the social optimum requires x to
be equal to the privately optimal level N(z) (which may be zero). Then, immediately
by Proposition 1, we have the unsurprising result that since investment is socially
unproductive, in equilibrium its supply is excessive. However, if we make the assumption
that investment is productive or πx > 0, then comparison of (5) and (19) leads directly
to the next result.
Proposition 7. Assume conditions (c)-(e) on π(·) and that πx(z, s, x) > 0. Then there
exists a unique solution x = N∗(z) > 0 to the equation (19) at each level of z. For
at least some types, the non-cooperative level of investment x(z) is less than the social
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Figure 5: Under NTU, investment in the more competitive environment xA may be
further from the social optimum N∗ for low- and high-ability workers than investment
in the less competitive environment xB.
optimum N∗(z). That is, there is an z1 ∈ (z, z¯] such that x(z) < N∗(z) on [z, z1).
To compare two economies A, B assume either GA(z) >st GB(z) or HB(z) >st HA(z).
Then, there is an z2 ∈ (z, z¯) such that xA(z) < xB(z) < N∗(z) on (z, z2).
That is, at least some low types invest too little as their low prospects give no
incentive to do more than which is privately optimal. However, it is impossible to
determine for higher types whether investment is too high or too low. While it is
possible for all types to invest too little, one would imagine that typically high types
will invest too much. Particularly, if the production function is strictly concave, then as
the marginal product of investment falls, the socially optimal investment will approach
the privately optimal level for high x and cross the non-cooperative level.
The results on investment do have a striking conclusion, as illustrated in Figure
5. In the more competitive environment, which has a matching function SA(z) that is
worse from the point of view of workers, distortions from the socially optimal are larger.
In particular, the low-type workers who in any case invest too little will invest even less.
And the high-ability workers who may put in too much eﬀort will do even more. Note
that Figure 5 illustrates only one particular scenario: in general, there is no assurance
that N∗ will cross xA and xB only once or that it will cross at all.
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5.2 Transferable Utility
Under TU, the welfare results are quite diﬀerent. The fact that wages respond to pro-
ductive investment gives a natural incentive to invest. Unfortunately, under incomplete
information, investment also serves to gain an improved match, which leads to excess
investment. The total payoﬀ of a match is given by
W = π(z, S(z), x)− c(z, x) (20)
as the sum of wages and profits must equal output π(·). Thus the complementary
slackness condition for a social optimum, conditional on positive assortative matching,
is
x
dW
dx
= x[πx(z, s, x)− cx(z, x)] = 0. (21)
That is, when x is a productive investment, the social optimum equates the marginal
cost of investment to the worker cx and the investment’s marginal product πx. Note
that under TU, this condition is the same as for the privately optimal level of investment
T (z). This reflects the results of CMP (2001), who find that with complete information,
a matching tournament can induce the eﬃcient amount of investment.
However, under incomplete information there is a gap between private incentives and
the social optimum. This is because each individual has an additional private return
from increasing investment as it permits a better match. However, a change in either
the distribution of jobs or workers that induces greater competition pushes investment
closer to the socially optimal level.
Proposition 8. In the matching tournament with incomplete information and under
TU, the equilibrium level of investment x(z) exceeds the socially optimal level T ∗(z)
almost everywhere. To compare two economies A,B assume either GA(z) >st GB(z) or
HB(z) >st HA(z). Then, xB(z) > xA(z) > T ∗(z) on (z, z¯].
6 Unemployment
Until now, we have assumed that all workers are matched to jobs. Obviously, it is a
characteristic of many real world labor markets that the least successful candidates fail
to attract any oﬀers as there are more candidates than there are job openings. It is
relatively easy to modify the basic matching tournament model to allow for this. We
find again that the model delivers sensible comparative statics. For example, a decrease
in the number of jobs available relative to the number of workers will, in the TU case,
lower wages at every level of ability.
Assume now that that the measure of firms relative to that of workers is 1− μ, so
that a proportion 1 > μ > 0 of workers will not find employment. Under assortative
matching, these will be the least able, so that those having ability on the range [z, zˆ),
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where G(zˆ) = μ, will be unemployed and have no match, which I write as s = s0
with s0 < s, that is, the value of being unmatched is worse than being matched to the
worst job. The benefits from being unemployed are assumed to be diﬀerent in TU and
NTU and will be specified below. But in either case I assume the following assortative
matching scheme
S(z) =
s0 for z ∈ [z, zˆ),
H−1
µ
G(z)− μ
1− μ
¶
for z ∈ [zˆ, z¯]. (22)
This implies that S0(z) is equal to zero on [z, zˆ) and to g(z)/(h(S(z))(1− μ)) on [zˆ, z¯].
Our main interest is the eﬀect of increased scarcity of jobs on equilibrium outcomes.
An increase in μ in this framework is like a proportional increase in the population of
workers at every level of ability, while keeping the distribution of available jobs fixed.
Thus, an increase in unemployment increases competition for jobs. Given the above
matching rule (22), an increase in μ, the proportion unemployed, will lower the quality
of job for those who find employment for a given ability level (that is, S(z) falls on
the range [zˆ, z¯]). Given that this eﬀect is similar to the one generated by a decrease
in quality in jobs as analysed in Section 4, perhaps not surprisingly the consequent
comparative static eﬀects are also similar.
6.1 Non-Transferable Utility
Again it is possible to construct a symmetric separating equilibrium based on assortative
matching. Given our earlier assumption that a worker’s benefit is increasing in the
quality of her match, it must be that b(z, s0, x) < b(z, s, x). That is, the benefit of
unemployment is worse than that of the worst job. Further, since the match they
obtain does not vary with investment, those workers who anticipate unemployment will
not invest any more than the privately optimal level. A problem is that if the worst job
is strictly better than unemployment, there must be a jump in the equilibrium strategy
x(z) at zˆ to prevent unemployed workers imitating the investment levels of those who
are successful. It is still possible for there to be a pure strategy equilibrium, provided
one provides suitable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs.
Proposition 9. Let x(z) = N(z) on [z, zˆ) where μ = G(zˆ). Let xˆ ≥ N(zˆ) solve
U(zˆ, s, xˆ) = U(zˆ, s0, N(zˆ)). Let x(z) be the solution to (6) on [zˆ, z¯] with boundary
condition x(zˆ) = xˆ. Then x(z), together with the matching scheme (22), is a symmetric
equilibrium strategy of the matching tournament under NTU.
The obvious question is what happens if the ratio of workers to jobs increases.
Clearly, unemployment goes up, but we can also show that worker utility falls as the job
market becomes more competitive. Further, it discourages eﬀort for the lowly ranked,
but increases investment by the highly ranked. Define G(zˆi) = μi for i = A,B. With
higher μ, the ability level of the lowest ranked worker to find employment will be also
be higher, so that zˆA > zˆB if μA > μB. In fact, it is relatively easy to obtain appropriate
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results from the earlier Proposition 4, replacing z with zˆB at each point of the proof.
So, the comparative statics with unemployment are stated here as a corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose μA > μB. Let xA(z), UA(z) and xB(z), UB(z) be the equilibrium
strategy and utility respectively under the two respective values of μ. Then, UA(z) <
UB(z) for all z ∈ (zˆB, z¯]. Further, there is a point z˜ ∈ (zˆB, z¯) such that xA(z) < xB(z)
on (zˆB, z˜) but xA(z) > xB(z) on (z˜, z¯].
6.2 Transferable Utility
Under TU, assume that the μ unmatched workers are paid a fixed wage or benefit so
that w(z, s0, x) = w for z ∈ [z, zˆ). Clearly, again the unemployed choose the privately
optimal investment, as investment aﬀects neither their wage nor match. As in the NTU
case, there may be a problem with a discontinuity at zˆ as there S(z) jumps from s0 to
s. Particularly, if the worst job pays more than the unemployment benefit, then some
unemployed workers might be happy to raise investment above the privately optimal
level in order to get that job.
Thus, for a pure strategy equilibrium we need continuity in the wage schedule. This
is possible, if the worst firm appropriates the entire surplus of the match with the
worst employed worker, so that the worst employed worker is paid no more than the
unemployed. This is technically convenient but the presence of an excess supply of
labor makes it reasonable economically. The way to implement this is to set the value
of the constant C in the wage equation (11) to be equal to a particular value, in this
case the unemployment benefit w. Thus, for the employed, that is for z ∈ [zˆ, z¯], let
w(z, S(z), x) =
Z z
zˆ
πz(t, S(t), 0) dt+
Z x
T (zˆ)
πx(z, S(z), t) dt+ w. (23)
So, the wage of the lowest ranked employed worker is equal to the unemployment benefit,
or w(zˆ, s, T (zˆ)) = w. We then have the following equilibrium.
Proposition 10. Let w(z, S(z), x) = w on [z, zˆ) and let w(z, S(z), x) be given by (23)
on the interval [zˆ, z¯], where S(z) is as given in (22). Let x(z) = T (z) on [z, zˆ), where
μ = G(zˆ) and, on [zˆ, z¯], let x(z) be the solution to (14) with boundary condition x(zˆ) =
T (zˆ). Then x(z) is a symmetric equilibrium strategy of the matching tournament under
TU.
It is also possible to show that an increase in unemployment will lower equilibrium
wages and utility. Investment falls at each ability level as well. Again the result follows
from the earlier comparative statics results of Propositions 5 and 6.
Corollary 2. Suppose μA > μB and let G(zˆi) = μi for i = A,B. Let wA(z), xA(z),
UA(z) and wB(z), xB(z), UB(z) be, respectively the equilibrium wage, strategy and utility
under the two respective values of μ. Then wA(z) < wB(z), xA(z) < xB(z) and UA(z) <
UB(z) on (zˆB, z¯].
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7 Conclusions
This paper has introduced a model of relative signaling in a tournament-like labor
market. By allowing for vertical diﬀerentiation among employers as well as workers,
it generalizes the classic model of Spence (1973). Competition for good jobs generates
competition for relative position, implying that the outcome for any individual worker
depends on the distribution of characteristics of all firms and all workers. It is true that
these relative eﬀects are known to exist in matching and assignment models, see, for
example, Costrell and Loury (2004). However, in the assignment literature, matching
is based on the intrinsic characteristics of workers and jobs. Therefore there is no
explicit competition between workers, no comparative statics on workers’ education
decisions and no welfare analysis, as everything is eﬃcient. Here, matching is based on
investment decisions by workers that are driven by the matching opportunities available.
This feature diﬀerentiates the model from traditional signaling models, as here changes
in either the distribution of firms and workers, representing changes in the demand and
supply of labor respectively, aﬀect equilibrium strategies and welfare.
The equilibria in this model, as is common under imperfect information, are not
eﬃcient. Workers may overinvest in education because it serves as a signal of ability
as well as increasing productivity. The innovation here is to show that, when the
job market is a tournament, this ineﬃciency depends on the distribution of ability.
As Frank (1997) observes, such positional competition has externalities which could
potentially be lessened by taxation. That is, suitable labor taxes could increase rather
than decrease labor market eﬃciency. One of the contributions of this paper is to
refine previous arguments that have focussed on the case where position is signaled by
wasteful activities, such as conspicuous consumption. In fact, it is when signaling is in
the form of a productive activity such as education that the current model of positional
competition gives the greatest support for redistributive taxation.14 This is because
in the equilibrium of the matching tournament analyzed here, low-ability workers can
underinvest in developing useful skills, and high-ability workers may overinvest with
respect to the social optimum.
I also hope that matching tournaments will provide a useful framework for the
analysis of a number of labor market issues. It has been found (Oyer 2006) that the
returns to participating in a matching labor market can be procyclical, with graduates
obtaining better matches in good years than in bad. However, there is a further ques-
tion of whether such variations in the level of competition are anticipated by market
participants, leading to changes in their investment decisions in a way predicted by
the model presented here. Two recent empirical studies provide fascinating supporting
evidence. Ramey and Ramey (2009) report that US parents are investing more time in
their children’s education in response to increased competition in university admissions.
Similarly, Wei and Zhang (2009) argue that parents in China anticipate the competition
14According to earlier work (Hopkins and Kornienko 2004), taxes that correct the externality from
wasteful expenditure are as likely to be regressive as progressive.
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that their sons will face in the marriage market due to unbalanced gender ratios, and
so increase saving to enhance their sons’ relative wealth.
This paper already has shown that greater competition can induce greater dispersion
in educational investment with those at the bottom end of the labor market investing
less and the high ability investing more. It has also demonstrated that the labor market
response will depend on the degree of wage flexibility. For example, if wages are not
fully flexible then this increase in competition will actually worsen eﬃciency. This
suggests that the eﬀects of greater competition on investment decisions will be diﬀerent
in countries that have flexible labor markets than in those where labor markets are
more regulated. In order to address these issues more fully, further work is necessary
to develop the analysis of the simultaneous determination of education and wages, an
issue that has only received an initial treatment here.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: In a symmetric equilibrium with a strictly increasing strategy
x(z), the probability that an agent of type zi has higher investment than another of
type zj will be F (x(zi)) = Pr[x(zi) > x(zj)] = Pr[x−1(x(zi)) > zj] = G(zi). Then the
positive assortative matching φ that assigns an agent with investment xi to a firm of
type si = H−1(F (xi)) = H−1(G(zi)) is clearly stable as while any worker with rank
G(zi) would prefer a match with any firm with s > H−1(G(zi)), such a firm would
prefer its current match whose z, say zˆ, would be greater than zi (and since x(z) is
strictly increasing, xˆ = x(zˆ) > xi). Suppose there is another matching φ˜, such that a
set of workers Z with positive measure are matched diﬀerently than under the positive
assortative matching φ. Then, there must exist zˆ ∈ Z, such that φ˜(G(zˆ)) > G(zˆ), that
is, there must be a positive measure of workers who are matched strictly higher than
under φ. For this matching to be stable, all workers with ability higher than zˆ must
be matched with firms whose s is greater than φ˜(G(zˆ)). If not, then firm s = φ˜(G(zˆ))
could propose a match with a worker of type z˜ where z˜ > zˆ and the worker z˜ would find
it acceptable. But the measure of workers with z higher than zˆ, λ(z ≥ zˆ), is strictly
larger than the measure of firms with s greater than φ˜(G(zˆ)), λ(s ≥ φ˜(G(zˆ))). But this
implies that φ˜ is not measure-preserving.
Proof of Proposition 1: That the only separating equilibrium is a solution to the
diﬀerential equation (6) with boundary condition x(z) = N(z) follows from Theorems
1 and 2 of Mailath (1987, p. 1353). It then follows by Proposition 3 of Mailath
(1987, p. 1362) that x(z) > N(z) on (z, z¯). The task is to show that the current
model fits into Mailath’s framework. First, the boundary condition must hold as in a
separating equilibrium, an individual with ability z has perceived rank 0 and utility
U(z, s, x) = U(z, s, x(z)) that does not depend on the agent’s rank. Therefore, in
equilibrium she chooses x to maximize U(z, s, x). That is, she must choose N(z), or
there would be a profitable deviation. Second, in Mailath’s paper, the signaler’s utility is
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of the form (in current notation) V (z, zˆ, x) where V is a smooth utility function and zˆ is
the perceived type, so that in a separating equilibrium the signaler has utility V (z, z, x).
To apply this here, first, fix G(z) and H(s). Now, clearly, one can define the function
V (·) such that V (z, zˆ, x) = b(z, S(zˆ), x)− c(z, x) everywhere on [z, z¯]× [s, s¯]× IR+. One
can then verify that the conditions (i)-(v) imposed on U(·) imply conditions (1)-(5) of
Mailath (1987, p. 1352) on V .15 Condition (1) is that V is C2, condition (2) is that V2
is always non-zero, and here V2 = bz > 0. Condition (3) is that V13 is never zero and
here V13 = bzx− czx > 0. Since here V33 < 0, Mailath’s condition (5) that V3 is bounded
when V33 ≥ 0 is automatically satisfied.
Mailath’s condition (4) requires that V3(z, z, x) = 0 has a unique solution in x which
maximizes V (z, z, x). If bx > 0, then this follows from the assumptions that bxx ≤ 0, and
the assumption that c is convex in x. However, if bx = 0, then the maximizer of V (z, z, x)
with respect to x is x = N(z) = 0. This actually makes equivalent results to Mailath’s
easier. In particular, Mailath’s Proposition 3 that establishes that, in current notation,
x(z) 6= N(z) on (z, z¯] becomes easy as if bx = 0 then x0(z) = bs(z, S(z), x)/cx(z, x) >
0 = N 0(z). This also obviates the need for Mailath’s Proposition 5 as the simpler
diﬀerential equation x0(z) = bs(z, S(z), x)/cx(z, x) is Lipschitz continuous even at z.
Finally, to show that workers are worse oﬀ than under privately optimal investment,
let U(z) = b(z, S(z), x(z))−c(z, x(z)) and UN(z) = b(z, S(z), N(z))−c(z,N(z)) denote
equilibrium utility and utility under privately optimal investment N(z) respectively.
Since N(z) maximizes a worker’s utility given match S(z) and x(z) > N(z) for all
z ∈ (z, z¯), the result follows. .
Proof of Proposition 2: Following Becker (1973) (see also Sattinger 1979; CMP
2001), one obtains from (8),
w(z + ε, S(z + ε), x)− w(z, S(z), x) ≥ π(z + ε, S(z), x)− π(z, S(z), x).
Dividing both sides by  and taking the limit of  to zero, one finds that
wz(z, S(z), x) + ws(z, S(z), x)S0(z) ≥ πz(z, S(z), x). (24)
Similarly from (9), one obtains
wx(z, S(z), x) ≥ πx(z, S(z), x). (25)
This also give us a bound on the total derivative dw(z, S(z), x)/dz ≥ πz + πxx0(z). A
similar analysis finds that the share of the firm satisfies
dr(z, S(z), x)/dz ≥ πs(z, S(z), x)S0(z). (26)
But since dw(z, S(z), x)/dz + dr(z, S(z), x)/dz = dπ(z, S(z), x)/dz = πxx0(z) + πz +
S0(z)πs, the preceding conditions hold with equality. The choice of the boundary con-
dition C = w(z, s, 0) is arbitrary, except that it must be feasible, i.e. 0 ≤ w(z, 0) ≤
π(z, s, 0).
15Mailath, in proving the intermediate result Proposition 5 (1987, p. 1364), also assumes that ∂V/∂zˆ
is bounded. Here, if we assume that both bs and S0(z) are bounded (the latter requires g(·) is bounded
and h(·) is non-zero), this result will also hold.
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We check that these marginal conditions imply general as well as local stability (that
is, it is not possible to construct a blocking pair even when one can choose any type,
and not just within a radius of ε). Take any two types of worker z1, z2 with z2 > z1.
The stability condition (8) can be rewritten as
w(z2, S(z2), x)− w(z1, S(z1), x) ≥ π(z2, S(z1), x)− π(z1, S(z1), x).
Using wz(z, S(z), x) + ws(z, S(z), x)S0(z) = πz(z, S(z), x), yieldsZ z2
z1
πz(z, S(z), x) dz ≥
Z z2
z1
πz(z, S(z1), x) dz. (27)
Now, since matching is positive and assortative, the matching function S(z) is increasing
and S(z) > S(z1) for any z ∈ (z1, z2]. If, as assumed, πzs > 0 then the above inequality
must hold for any pair z2 > z1.
To prove that positive assortative matching is the only stable form of matching,
suppose that instead there is a matching φ˜ that is not positive assortative. Let S˜(z) =
φ˜(G(z)). Then, one can choose z2 > z1 such that S˜(z1) > S˜(z) for all z on the interval
(z1, z2). For this matching to be stable, given z2 > z1, wages must satisfy the inequality
(8) and hence the inequality (27) with S˜(·) replacing S(·). But as S˜(z) < S˜(z1) on
(z1, z2) and given the complementarity assumptions (c) on π(·), this inequality is clearly
violated. Thus, positive assortative matching again is the only stable matching.
Proof of Proposition 3: The aim is again to apply the results of Mailath (1987).
Fix S(z), given the two exogenous distributions G(z) and H(s). Then, from the exoge-
nous partial derivatives given in (10), one can integrate using formula (11) to obtain
w(z, S(z), x) as a smooth increasing function [z, z¯]× IR 7→ IR (on integrability, see, for
example, Varian 1992, pp. 483-4). Given this wage function, a worker of perceived type
zˆ will have utility U = w(zˆ, S(zˆ), x) − c(z, x). In a symmetric equilibrium, the lowest
type worker has a match s and therefore should choose x to maximize U(z, w(z, s, x), x),
that is choose T (z), which confirms the boundary condition. Furthermore, define utility
function V (·) as V (z, zˆ, x) = w(zˆ, S(zˆ), x) − c(z, x). Then it is easy to verify that our
assumptions on c(·) and π(·) imply Mailath’s (1987, p1352) conditions (1)-(5) on V .
In particular, note that V2 = wz = πz > 0, V13 = −czx > 0 and that V3 = πx − cx.
Mailath’s condition (4) requires that V3(z, z, x) = 0 has a unique solution. If πx > 0
then this follows from the assumptions that πxx ≤ 0, and the assumption that c is
convex in x.16 However, if πx = 0 then V3(z, z, x) < 0 and T (z) = 0. But as established
in the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to adapt Mailath’s proofs to this slightly diﬀer-
ent case. Existence of an incentive compatible signaling equilibrium then follows from
Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath. It is then easy to adapt the proof of Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3 of Mailath (1987, p1362) to show that x(z) > T (z) on (z, z¯).
Finally, to show that workers are worse oﬀ in equilibrium than under privately opti-
mal investment, denote U(z) = w(z, S(z), x(z))−c(z, x(z)) and UT (z) = w(z, S(z), T (z))−
16Mailath also assumes that ∂V/∂zˆ is bounded above (see the previous footnote). This here is
ensured if πz is bounded above.
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c(z, T (z)) be equilibrium utility and utility under privately optimal investment T (z) re-
spectively. Since T (z) maximizes a worker’s utility given the wage schedule w(z, x) as
defined in (11) and x(z) > N(z) for all z ∈ (z, z¯), the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 2: The first claim follows as since H(·) is a strictly increasing
function so is H−1(·). Therefore, if for any z, GA(z) < GB(z) then SA(z) < SB(z).
For the second claim note that if HB >st HA, then we have HA(s) > HB(s) for all
s ∈ (s, s¯). This implies that if G(z) = HA(s−) = HB(s+), then s+ > s−. But then
s− = H−1A (G(z)) < s
+ = H−1B (G(z)). Finally, S
0(z) = G0(z)/H 0(S(z)), thus given our
assumption that if GA >st GB then G0A(z) < G
0
B(z), it clearly follows that S
0
A(z) <
S0B(z), and similarly if HB >st HA.
Proof of Proposition 4: The function U(z) is continuously diﬀerentiable because
x(z) and S(z) are continuously diﬀerentiable. Given that the boundary condition
x(z) = N(z) is the same in any equilibrium, we have UA(z) = UB(z). In equilibrium,
x(z) > N(z) (except at z). It then follows from assumption (v) that Ux(z, S(z), x(z)) =
bx(z, S(z), x(z))− cx(z, x(z)) is strictly negative.
Note that any point where UA(z) = UB(z) on (z, z¯), given that by Lemma 2 one has
SA(z) < SB(z), it must be that xA(z) < xB(z). But then as U 0(z) is strictly increasing
in x(z) and increasing in S(z) by assumption (iv), it must be that U 0A(z) < U
0
B(z) at any
point of crossing. Therefore, there can be only one crossing of UA(z) by UB(z) and that
must be from below. We now rule out the remaining possibility that UA(z) ≥ UB(z)
on an interval [z, z1] with z1 ≤ z¯. On the interior of the interval, again we have
SA(z) < SB(z) and, therefore, to make it possible that UA(z) ≥ UB(z), it must be
that xA(z) < xB(z). This implies that U 0A(z) < U
0
B(z) on (z, z1). This, together with
UA(z) = UB(z) implies UA(z) < UB(z) on that interval which is a contradiction.
I turn to investment. First, as by Lemma 2 S0B(z) > S0A(z), but xA(z) = xB(z)
by the common boundary condition, then x0B(z) > x0A(z). So, xB(z) > xA(z) holds
immediately to the right of z. Suppose there is no crossing on (z, z¯], so that xA(z¯) <
xB(z¯) which implies that, as SA(z¯) = SB(z¯) = s¯, the utility for the highest type must
be ranked UA(z¯) > UB(z¯), which is a contradiction to our earlier result, Proposition
4. Now, suppose xA(z¯) = xB(z¯), then it follows that UA(z¯) = UB(z¯). But as UA(z) <
UB(z) on (z, z¯) then (generically) one has U 0A(z¯) > U
0
B(z¯). For this last inequality to
hold, given SA(z¯) = SB(z¯), then, as U 0(z) is strictly increasing in x(z) by assumption
(iv), it must be that xA(z¯) > xB(z¯), a contradiction. Thus, xA(z¯) > xB(z¯). This implies
one final result, that UA(z¯) < UB(z¯).
Proof of Proposition 5: Given the common boundary condition that xA(z) =
xB(z) = T (z) and that SA(z) = SB(z) = s, evaluating the diﬀerential equation (14) at
z, we find that x0A(z) = x
0
B(z). However, given Lemma 2, we have
x00A(z)− x00B(z) =
πzs(z, s, x(z)) (S0A(z)− S0B(z))
cx(z, x(z))− πx(z, s, x(z))
< 0.
This implies that x0A(z) < x
0
B(z) immediately to the right of z and hence xA(z) < xB(z)
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also holds in a neighborhood of z. Consider any possible subsequent crossing of xA(z)
and xB(z). At any point where xA(z) = xB(z) we would have
x0A(z) =
πz(z, SA(z), x)
cx(z, x)− πx(z, SA(z), x)
<
πz(z, SB(z), x)
cx(z, x)− πx(z, SB(z), x)
= x0B(z)
by assumptions (c) and (d) on π and as SA(z) < SB(z) on (z, z¯). Hence xA(z) cannot
cross xB(z) from below on (z, z¯) (generically also not at z¯) and thus we have xA(z) <
xB(z) on (z, z¯].
Given the original definition of worker’s utility (7), the envelope theorem implies
that U 0(z) = −cz(z, x(z)) > 0. It has just been shown that xA(z) < xB(z) for all
z ∈ (z, z¯]. By assumption, it holds that czx < 0. Therefore, U 0A(z) = −cz(z, xA(z)) <
−cz(z, xB(z)) = U 0B(z) for all z ∈ (z, z¯). As UA(z) = UB(z) by the common boundary
condition x(z) = T (z), the result clearly follows.
Proof of Proposition 6: The earlier Proposition 5 established that xA(z) < xB(z)
on (z, z¯). This implies that the second integral on the right-hand side of the wage
equation (11) is strictly lower in case A than in case B. But as by Lemma 2 we have
SA(z) < SB(z) on (z, z¯), the first integral is lower by assumption (c) on π(·). Turning to
wages in terms of investment, or w(x), with substitution from the diﬀerential equation
(14) we have w0(x) = cx(γ(x), x). Note that from the earlier Proposition 5, we have
xA(z) < xB(z) on (z, z¯) with xA(z) = xB(z) = x(z). This implies that γA(x) > γB(x)
on (x(z), xA(z¯)). Now, since czx < 0 by assumption, we have that w0B(x) > w0A(x) on
(x(z), xA(z¯)) and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 7: The concavity of U in x and the concavity of π together
ensure the first order conditions (19) define a maximum. We have, for the lowest type,
x(z) = N(z) by Proposition 1. However, at z, as πx > 0, for a social optimum from
(19), the lowest type should produce more than N(z). The final result follows from
application of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 8: Existence of a unique solution T ∗(z) to (21) at every level of
z follows from assumption (e) on π(·) and the convexity of c(z, x) in x. The first result
then follows directly from comparison of (13) and (21). The comparative static result
follows from Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 9: Observe that, in the proposed equilibrium, investment levels
on the interval (N(zˆ), xˆ) are oﬀ the equilibrium path. Assume that if any worker
deviates and chooses x on that interval, firms believe with probability 1 that her type
z is strictly less than zˆ. Then any deviation by any unemployed worker to any level of
x ∈ [0, xˆ) will not result in a job oﬀer, so there is no incentive to make such a deviation.
Deviation to a level of x above xˆ is unprofitable by the definition of xˆ. For workers of
type z ∈ [zˆ, z¯], the equilibrium is the same as in the case of full employment.
Proof of Proposition 10: The proposed equilibrium strategy x(z) and wage schedule
w(z) = w(z, S(z), x(z)) are continuous at zˆ. Workers with ability on the interval [zˆ, z¯]
play the equilibrium identified in Proposition 3. Workers with ability on the interval
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[z, zˆ) have no incentive to deviate to x(zˆ), given the definition of T (z) and that the
resulting wage w is no higher. Deviation to x above x(zˆ) cannot profitable for a worker
with ability in [z, zˆ) since it is not profitable for a worker of ability zˆ.
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